Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets

被引：16

作者：

Riedl, A

Tyran, JR

机构：

[1] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark

[2] Tinbergen Inst, IZA, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

[3] Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 89卷 / 11-12期

关键词：

tax incidence; efficiency wages; gift exchange; experiments;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. Tax LSE is predicted to hold in gift-exchange labor markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. This is the case if the tax is perceived to be external to the gift-exchange relationship. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange labor market and find that it holds very well. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：2369 / 2382

页数：14

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