Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics

被引：92

作者：

Dixit, A ^{[1
]}

Londregan, J

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 68卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

interest groups; redistribution; fiscal federalism;

D O I：

10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00097-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system, and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems. We examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system. We examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers. We analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants. We also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：153 / 180

页数：28

共 22 条

[11] AN OPTIMAL TAXATION APPROACH TO FISCAL FEDERALISM [J].