Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited

被引：33

作者：

Berger, U ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wirtschaftsuniv Wien, Abt VW5, A-1090 Vienna, Austria

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 86卷 / 01期

关键词：

access charge; bill-and-keep; call externality; interconnection; telecommunications;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study network competition with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination in the presence of call externalities. We show that both the collusive and the welfare-maximizing access charges fall below marginal cost. Moreover, bill-and-keep arrangements are welfare improving compared with cost-based access pricing. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

收藏

页码：107 / 112

页数：6

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