A requiem for the USA - Is small shareholder monitoring effective?

被引:131
作者
Strickland, D
Wiles, KW
Zenner, M
机构
[1] UNIV N CAROLINA,KENAN FLAGLER BUSINESS SCH,CHAPEL HILL,NC 27599
[2] DEV GRP INC,SALISBURY,NC 28144
关键词
corporate governance; shareholder activism; monitoring; ownership structure;
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(95)00849-A
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
From 1986 to 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) provided a conduit through which small shareholders could unite and attempt to influence the governance of large US corporations. We show that the USA targeted large firms that underperformed the market, that its influence increased from 1990 to 1993, and that USA-sponsored proposals were more successful when the target firm was a poor performer with high institutional ownership. The announcement of 53 USA-negotiated agreements is associated with an average abnormal return of 0.9% or a total shareholder wealth gain of $1.3 billion, suggesting that USA-sponsored shareholder activism enhanced shareholder value.
引用
收藏
页码:319 / 338
页数:20
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