The paradox of liquidity

被引:465
作者
Myers, SC [1 ]
Rajan, RG
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355398555739
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The more liquid a firm's assets, the greater their value in a short-notice liquidation. It is generally thought that a firm should find it easier to raise external finance against more liquid assets. This paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity: greater asset liquidity reduces the firm's ability to commit to a specific course of action. As a result, greater asset liquidity can, in some circumstances, reduce the firm's capacity to raise external finance. Firms with "excessively'' liquid assets are in the best position to finance illiquid projects. This leads us to a theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation based on the liquidity of assets.
引用
收藏
页码:733 / 771
页数:39
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