Why do firms merge and then divest? A theory of financial synergy

被引:102
作者
Fluck, Z [1 ]
Lynch, AW [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/209617
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article develops a theory of mergers and divestitures. The motivation stems from inability to finance marginally profitable projects as stand-alones due to agency problems. A conglomerate merger is a technology that allows these projects to survive a period of distress. If profitability improves, the financing synergy ends and the acquirer divests the assets. Our theory reconciles two seemingly contradictory empirical findings. Mergers increase the combined values of acquirers and targets by financing positive net present value (NPV) projects that cannot be financed as stand-alones. At the same time, because these projects are only marginally profitable, conglomerates are less valuable than stand-alones.
引用
收藏
页码:319 / 346
页数:28
相关论文
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