The Price of a CEO's Rolodex

被引：181

作者：

Engelberg, Joseph ^{[1
]}

Gao, Pengjie ^{[2
]}

Parsons, Christopher A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

[2] Univ Notre Dame, Mendoza Coll Business, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2013年 / 26卷 / 01期

关键词：

G30; G34; G35; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTMENT; STOCK; CONNECTIONS; NETWORKING; MATTERS; BIAS; PAY;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhs114

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for "important" members, such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

引用

页码：79 / 114

页数：36

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