Delayed privatization

被引：71

作者：

Bortolotti, Bernardo ^{[1
,2
]}

Pinotti, Paolo ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Turin, I-20123 Milan, Italy

[2] FEEM, I-20123 Milan, Italy

[3] Bank Italy, I-00184 Rome, Italy

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2008年 / 136卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

privatization; political economy; war of attrition;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.

引用

页码：331 / 351

页数：21

共 39 条

[1]

ALESINA A, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P1170

[2]

Alesina A, 1998, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P197

[3]

[Anonymous], 2146 WORLD BANK

[4]

[Anonymous], 2004, The challenges of privatization: an international analysis