The European UMTS-auctions

被引：27

作者：

van Damme, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tilburg Univ, Ctr Econ Res, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2002年 / 46卷 / 4-5期

关键词：

auctions; telecommunications; game theory; UMTS;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00219-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we review, and draw some lessons from, the UMTS-auctions that have taken place in Europe during 2000 and 2001. We address several design issues and, in particular, focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion. An outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high, but the design issues perhaps somewhat more complex. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：846 / 858

页数：13

共 28 条

[1]

ABBINK K, 2001, UNPUB EXPT TEST DESI

[2] Deficit reduction through diversity: How affirmative action at the FCC increased auction competition [J].

Ayres, I ;

Cramton, P .

STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1996, 48 (04) :761-815

[3]

BORGERS T, 2001, UNPUB STRANGE BIDS B

[4]

BRANDENBURGER A, 1996, COMPETITION WIN WIN

[5]

*EUR COMM, 1994, GREEN PAP COMM APPR

[6]

*FORT BANK, 2000, UMTS REP BRUSS 2000

[7]

GILBERT RJ, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P514

[8]

GRIMM V, 2001, 3 GEN UMTS SPECTRUM

[9]

JEHIEL P, 2001, LICENSE AUCTIONS MAR

[10] Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications [J].

Klemperer, P .

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1998, 42 (3-5) :757-769

← 1 2 3 →