Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications

被引：144

作者：

Klemperer, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford Nuffield Coll, Oxford OX1 1NF, England

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1998年 / 42卷 / 3-5期

关键词：

auction theory; common values; winner's curse; takeovers; mergers; corporate acquisitions; PCS auction; spectrum auction; airwaves auction;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00123-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use a classroom game, the 'Wallet Game', to show that slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices in standard ascending (i.e. English) auctions of common-value objects. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or a small ownership of the object by one bidder. The effects of these asymmetries are greatly exarcabated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to Airwaves Auctions and Takeover Battles including the Glaxo-Wellcome Merger. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：757 / 769

页数：13

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