Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation

被引:41
作者
Hunold, Matthias [1 ]
Stahl, Konrad [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Heinrich Heine Univ Dusseldorf, Dusseldorf Inst Competit Econ, Dusseldorf, Germany
[2] Univ Mannheim, CEPR, CESifo, Mannheim, Germany
[3] ZEW, Mannheim, Germany
关键词
OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1111/1756-2171.12158
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing them to charge high downstream prices. The effects of passive backward acquisition are reinforced with the acquisition by several downstream firms in the efficient supplier. The results are sustained when suppliers charge two-part tariffs.
引用
收藏
页码:891 / 913
页数:23
相关论文
共 35 条
[1]  
Allain M., 2011, N11137 TSE
[2]   Corporate equity ownership, strategic alliances, and product market relationships [J].
Allen, JW ;
Phillips, GM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (06) :2791-2815
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1976, ANTITRUST PARADOX PO
[4]   Vertical Integration and Input Flows [J].
Atalay, Enghin ;
Hortacsu, Ali ;
Syverson, Chad .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2014, 104 (04) :1120-1148
[5]  
Baumol W., 1994, Revue d'conomie Industrielle, V69, P7
[6]   COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION [J].
BERNHEIM, BD ;
WHINSTON, MD .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) :269-281
[7]   VERTICAL SEPARATION [J].
BONANNO, G ;
VICKERS, J .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1988, 36 (03) :257-265
[8]   Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms [J].
Bourreau, Marc ;
Hombert, Johan ;
Pouyet, Jerome ;
Schutz, Nicolas .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 59 (04) :677-713
[9]   Divesting ownership in a rival [J].
Brito, Duarte ;
Cabral, Luis ;
Vasconcelos, Helder .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2014, 34 :9-24
[10]   Multilateral vertical contracting with an alternative supply: The welfare effects of a ban on price discrimination [J].
Caprice, S .
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2006, 28 (01) :63-80