COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION

被引：132

作者：

BERNHEIM, BD

WHINSTON, MD

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

[2] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

[3] NATL BUR ECON RES,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1985年 / 16卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555414

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：269 / 281

页数：13

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