The architecture of participation: Does code architecture mitigate free riding in the open source development model?

被引：211

作者：

Baldwin, Carliss Y. ^{[1
]}

Clark, Kim B.

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Baker Lib, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Brigham Young Univ, Rexburg, ID 83460 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2006年 / 52卷 / 07期

关键词：

architecture; modularity; option value; public goods; nonrival goods; free riding; open source; software development; prisoners' dilemma game; institutional economics; organizational economics;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1060.0546

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper argues that the architecture of a codebase is a critical factor that lies at the heart of the open source development process. We define two observable properties of an architecture: (1) modularity and (2) option value. Developers can often make informed judgments about modularity and option value from early, partially implemented code releases. We show that codebases that are more modular or have more option value (1) increase developers' incentives to join and remain involved in an open source development effort and (2) decrease the amount of free riding in equilibrium. These effects occur because modularity and option value create opportunities for the exchange of valuable work among developers, opportunities that do not exist in codebases that are not modular or have no option value.

引用

页码：1116 / 1127

页数：12

共 27 条

[1]

[Anonymous], OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

[2] Information, incentives, and option value: The Silicon Valley model [J].

Aoki, M ;

Takizawa, H .

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 2002, 30 (04) :759-786

[3]

Axelrod R, 2006, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO

[4]

Baldwin C.Y., 2000, Design rules: The power of modularity, V1

[5] Coase's penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm [J].

Benkler, Y .

YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2002, 112 (03) :369-+

[6] Psychological foundations of incentives [J].

Fehr, E ;

Falk, A .

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2002, 46 (4-5) :687-724

[7] How communities support innovative activities: an exploration of assistance and sharing among end-users [J].

Franke, N ;

Shah, S .

RESEARCH POLICY, 2003, 32 (01) :157-178

[8]

Ghosh R. A., 1998, First Monday, V3

[9]

GODFREY MW, 2000, ICSM 2000 P INT C SO

[10] Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: how users benefit by freely revealing their innovations [J].

Harhoff, D ;

Henkel, J ;

von Hippel, E .

RESEARCH POLICY, 2003, 32 (10) :1753-1769

← 1 2 3 →