Psychological foundations of incentives

被引:516
作者
Fehr, E [1 ]
Falk, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Econ Res, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
incentives; contracts; reciprocity; social approval; social norms; intrinsic motivation;
D O I
10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00208-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organizations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:687 / 724
页数:38
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