CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

被引：477

作者：

Jenter, Dirk ^{[1
,2
]}

Kanaan, Fadi ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Liberty Mutual Insurance, Dover, NH USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2015年 / 70卷 / 05期

关键词：

EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MORAL HAZARD; CORPORATE; GOVERNANCE; MECHANISMS; REGRESSION; FIRMS; LUCK;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.12282

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand-collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90(th) to the 10(th) percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.

引用

页码：2155 / 2183

页数：29

共 52 条

[1] A theory of friendly boards [J].

Adams, Renee B. ;

Ferreira, Daniel .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (01) :217-250

[2] The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation [J].

Aggarwal, RK ;

Samwick, AA .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1999, 107 (01) :65-105

[3] Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence [J].

Aggarwal, RK ;

Samwick, AA .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1999, 54 (06) :1999-2043

[4] Peer firms in relative performance evaluation [J].

Albuquerque, Ana .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2009, 48 (01) :69-89

[5]

[Anonymous], 1999, HDB LABOR EC

[6]

[Anonymous], 2002, ARE VOTERS RATIONAL

[7] AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CORPORATE-EXECUTIVES [J].

ANTLE, R ;

SMITH, A .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1986, 24 (01) :1-39

[8] PAY, PERFORMANCE, AND TURNOVER OF BANK CEOS [J].

BARRO, JR ;

BARRO, RJ .

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1990, 8 (04) :448-481

[9]

Bebchuk L., 2004, Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

[10]

Bebchuk Lucian A., 2001, WORKING PAPERS HARVA

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →