The efficiency and stability of R&D networks

被引：73

作者：

Koenig, Michael D. ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Battiston, Stefano ^{[3
]}

Napoletano, Mauro ^{[3
,4
,5
]}

Schweitzer, Frank ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, SIEPR, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Dept Management Technol & Econ, Chair Syst Design, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland

[4] OFCE Sci Po, F-06560 Valbonne, France

[5] SKEMA Business Sch, F-06560 Valbonne, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 75卷 / 02期

关键词：

R&D networks; Knowledge recombination; Indirect spillovers; Network efficiency; Network formation; INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION; STRATEGIC MODEL; INNOVATION; KNOWLEDGE; GRAPH; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the efficiency and stability of R&D networks in a model with network-dependent indirect spillovers. We show that the efficient network structure critically depends on the marginal cost of R&D collaborations. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient, while high marginal costs imply that the efficient network is asymmetric and has a nested structure. Regarding the stability of network structures, we show the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. The efficient network is stable for small industry size and small cost. In contrast, for large industry size, there is a wide region of cost in which the efficient network is not stable. This implies a divergence between efficiency and stability in large industries. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：694 / 713

页数：20

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