Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

被引：83

作者：

Bloch, Francis

Jackson, Matthew O.

机构：

[1] Univ Aix Marseille, GREQAM, F-13002 Marseille, France

[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2006年 / 34卷 / 03期

关键词：

networks; network games; game theory; equilibrium; side payments; transfers; bargaining;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.

引用

页码：305 / 318

页数：14

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