WHY FIRMS MAKE UNILATERAL INVESTMENTS SPECIFIC TO OTHER FIRMS: THE CASE OF OEM SUPPLIERS

被引:213
作者
Kang, Min-Ping [2 ]
Mahoney, Joseph T. [1 ]
Tan, Danchi [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Coll Business, Dept Business Adm, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[2] Shih Hsin Univ, Dept Commun Management, Taipei, Taiwan
[3] Natl Chengchi Univ, Dept Int Business, Taipei 11623, Taiwan
关键词
unilateral relationship-specific investment; OEM; knowledge spillover; reputation spillover; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS; INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS; SUPPORT EXCHANGE; BARGAINING POWER; EMPIRICAL-TEST; GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; KNOWLEDGE;
D O I
10.1002/smj.730
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines why and under what conditions firms will make unilateral relationship-specific investments to their transaction partners. We propose that firms are more likely to make such investments when the investment yields positive economic spillover values for other transactions with the same exchange partners as well as for third-party transactions. We also model two types of positive inter-project spillover effects that a transaction may generate: knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. We find empirical support for our developed theory, in the context of Taiwanese suppliers of original equipment manufacturers. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 135
页数:19
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