Globalizing the boardroom-The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance

被引：474

作者：

Masulis, Ronald W. ^{[3
]}

Wang, Cong ^{[2
]}

Xie, Fei ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] George Mason Univ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Univ New S Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 53卷 / 03期

关键词：

Foreign directors; Board meeting attendance; Earnings restatement; Cross-border acquisition; CEO compensation; CEO turnover; Firm performance; INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS; MARKET VALUATION; AUDIT COMMITTEE; DETERMINANTS; GEOGRAPHY; SIZE; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; US; DIVERSIFICATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.12.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the benefits and costs associated with foreign independent directors (FIDs) at U.S. corporations. We find that firms with FIDs make better cross-border acquisitions when the targets are from the home regions of FIDs. However, FIDs also display poor board meeting attendance records and are associated with a greater likelihood of intentional financial misreporting, higher CEO compensation, and a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. Finally, firms with FIDs exhibit significantly poorer performance, especially as their business presence in the FID's home region becomes less important. (c) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：527 / 554

页数：28

共 81 条

[1] A theory of friendly boards [J].