Political connections, media monitoring and long-term loans

被引：7

作者：

Deming Yang ^{[1
]}

Zhengfei Lu ^{[2
]}

Danglun Luo ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Management School, Jinan University

[2] Guanghua School of Management,Peking University

[3] Lingnan College,Sun Yat-Sen University

来源：

China Journal of Accounting Research | 2014年 / 7卷 / 03期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Political connections Long-term loans Media monitoring;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F832.51 []; F233 [会计工作组织与制度];

学科分类号：

020204 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120201 ;

摘要：

We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed firms and find that it is easier for firms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended debt maturities than it is for firms without political connections. Our investigation indicates that this phenomenon is significantly less common with increased media monitoring. Houston et al.(2011) find strong evidence that the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb corruption.

引用

页码：165 / 177

页数：13

共 21 条

[1] Chairman's government background, excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises [J].