双层股权结构的“日落条款”

被引：46

作者：

沈朝晖

机构：

[1] 清华大学法学院

来源：

环球法律评论 | 2020年 / 42卷 / 03期

关键词：

双层股权结构; 日落条款; 特质愿景理论; “遵守或解释”治理准则;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D912.29 [经济法];

学科分类号：

030107 ;

摘要：

特质愿景理论支持双层股权结构,双层股权结构会增加代理成本,而日落条款则是降低相应代理成本的重要制度。从功能分析的视角来看,日落条款可划分为三类:第一类是缩小现金流权与投票权分离程度的日落条款;第二类是由企业家特质愿景所支持的日落条款;第三类是基于企业生命周期理论与双层股权结构公司的治理弱点与隐患,为了定期审查与转换无效率的双层股权结构而产生的固定期限日落条款。为实现不同类型日落条款的功能,应采取不同的立法方式。对于前两类日落条款,可采取法律强制性规定的方式;对于固定期限日落条款,可采取自由市场派与法定强制派二者中间的"遵守或解释"方式,并可通过此种方式化解相关批评。

引用

页码：71 / 84

页数：14

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