激励机制错位矫正与企业全要素生产率提升研究

被引:21
作者
盛明泉
任侨
王文兵
机构
[1] 安徽财经大学公司治理与资本效率研究院
关键词
激励机制; 全要素生产率; 价值分配; 价值创造; 生命周期;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F832.51 []; F272.92 [人事管理];
学科分类号
1201 ; 020204 ;
摘要
以沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨了激励机制错位这一系统性问题对企业全要素生产率所产生的影响。研究结果表明:激励机制错位抑制企业全要素生产率增长,而这一影响在经过变量替换、样本重置等稳健性测试之后依然存在。进一步的机制检验发现,激励机制错位之所以负向影响全要素生产率,原因在于其增加了代理成本,并且降低了研发产出。调节机制检验也进一步证明,提高内部控制质量以及一定的股权集中度能够缓解激励机制错位的负面效应。此外,激励机制错位对于全要素生产率的抑制效应,在成熟期与衰退期企业中更为显著。
引用
收藏
页码:843 / 852
页数:10
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