REPUTATIONS IN THE ADOPTION OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY

被引:31
作者
HENDRICKS, K
机构
[1] University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0167-7187(92)90065-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the effects of uncertainty on the timing of adoption of a new technology in a duopoly. Firms are uncertain of the innovative capabilities of their rivals and about the profitability of adoption. These features lead to a richer and, in some respects, more plausible theory of adoption, in which rents from delayed adoption are always realized, and returns are not equalized across adoption times.
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收藏
页码:663 / 677
页数:15
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