REPUTATION IN THE SIMULTANEOUS PLAY OF MULTIPLE OPPONENTS

被引:34
作者
FUDENBERG, D [1 ]
KREPS, DM [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297482
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:541 / 568
页数:28
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