EFFICIENCY DESPITE MUTUALLY PAYOFF-RELEVANT PRIVATE INFORMATION - THE FINITE CASE

被引:40
作者
JOHNSON, S
PRATT, JW
ZECKHAUSER, RJ
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV,JOHN F KENNEDY SCH GOVT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
[2] HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2938354
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:873 / 900
页数:28
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