AUTONOMY AND INCENTIVES IN CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISES

被引：16

作者：

GROVES, T ^{[1
]}

HONG, YM ^{[1
]}

MCMILLAN, J ^{[1
]}

NAUGHTON, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CORNELL UNIV,ITHACA,NY 14853

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 109卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When the responsibility for output decisions was shifted from the state to the firm, and when firms were allowed to retain more of their profits, managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened workers' incentives. The managers paid more in bonuses and hired more workers on fixed-term contracts. The new incentives were effective: productivity increased with increases in bonus payments and in contract workers. The increase in autonomy raised workers' incomes (but not managers' incomes) and investment in the enterprise, but tended not to raise remittances to the state.

引用

页码：183 / 209

页数：27

共 27 条

[11] USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS [J].