BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE BELIEFS

被引:37
作者
DASPREMONT, C
GERARDVARET, LA
机构
[1] UNIV STRASBOURG 1,F-67084 STRASBOURG,FRANCE
[2] UNIV AIX MARSEILLE 3,F-13621 AIX EN PROVENCE,FRANCE
[3] UNIV BONN,INST GESELLSCH & WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCH,D-5300 BONN,FED REP GER
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:83 / 103
页数:21
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