DYNAMIC-GAMES IN ORGANIZATION THEORY

被引：12

作者：

RADNER, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU,NEW YORK,NY 10003

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1991年 / 16卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(91)90049-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：217 / 260

页数：44

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