COMPENSATION POLICY AND THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET

被引：80

作者：

GAVER, JJ

GAVER, KM

机构：

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 1995年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3665874

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We analyze the proportions of executive pay derived from salary, bonus, long-term incentive compensation, and stock-based compensation for a sample of 321 Fortune 1,000 firms in 1992. We find that firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher levels of total compensation to their executives. Executives of growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation (such as performance awards, restricted stock grants, and stock option grants), while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from fixed salary. An implication is that long-term incentive contracts reduce agency costs associated with manager-shareholder information asymmetries in growth firms.

引用

页码：19 / 32

页数：14