THE SEALED-BID MECHANISM - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY

被引：72

作者：

RADNER, R ^{[1
]}

SCHOTTER, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU,DEPT ECON,NEW YORK,NY 10003

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1989年 / 48卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90124-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：179 / 220

页数：42

共 16 条

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[7]

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[8] EQUILIBRIA OF THE SEALED-BID MECHANISM FOR BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

LEININGER, W ;

LINHART, PB ;

RADNER, R .

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[9] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].

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