INVESTMENT DECISIONS UNDER 1ST AND 2ND PRICE AUCTIONS

被引：9

作者：

KING, I

WELLING, L

MCAFEE, RP

机构：

[1] UNIV VICTORIA,DEPT ECON,POB 3050,VICTORIA V8W 3P5,BC,CANADA

[2] UNIV TEXAS,AUSTIN,TX 78712

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 39卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90263-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A seller of an indivisible object faces multiple buyers, whose valuations are a function of their unobservable prior investments. A second price auction generates efficient investment, but the seller prefers a first price sealed bid auction, which induces inefficient investment.

引用

页码：289 / 293

页数：5