THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION IN STRATEGIC MARKET GAMES - A CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM

被引:62
作者
DUBEY, P
GEANAKOPLOS, J
SHUBIK, M
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关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-4068(87)90002-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:105 / 137
页数:33
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