ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BANK LENDING, AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS - A STYLIZED MODEL OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS

被引:965
作者
SHARPE, SA
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D O I
10.2307/2328715
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
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页码:1069 / 1087
页数:19
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