LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF INFORMATION-REVEALING INCENTIVE SCHEMES IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

被引:7
作者
MILLER, J [1 ]
MURRELL, P [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV MARYLAND,DEPT ECON,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0147-5967(81)90046-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 271
页数:21
相关论文
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