ON ULTIMATUM BARGAINING EXPERIMENTS - A PERSONAL REVIEW

被引：191

作者：

GUTH, W

机构：

[1] Humboldt-University of Berlin, D-10178 Berlin

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1995年 / 27卷 / 03期

关键词：

ULTIMATUM; BARGAINING; EXPERIMENTS; GAME THEORY; DICTATORSHIP;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(94)00071-L

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This review of ultimatum bargaining experiments concentrates on studies in which the author was actively involved, The basic game situation is either the ultimatum game or multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. We outline a behavioral theory of ultimatum bargaining based on a dynamic reasoning process. The stages of this process specify either an intention generator and its corresponding intention filter or, as the final step, an ex post-evaluation of the actual behaviour. In our concluding remarks the merits of behavioral theories versus rational choice-explanations are elaborated.

引用

页码：329 / 344

页数：16

共 35 条

[1] DO PEOPLE EXPLOIT THEIR BARGAINING POWER - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY [J].