OPTIMAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE EXTREME INFORMATION ASSUMPTIONS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MACROMODELS

被引：178

作者：

FRIEDMAN, BM

机构：

[1] Harvard University, Cambridge

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 1979年 / 5卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-3932(79)90022-9

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

'One might reply that the rationality of a person's choice does not depend upon how much he knows, but only upon how well he reasons from whatever information he has, however incomplete. Our decision is perfectly rational provided that we face up to our circumstances and do the best we can.' (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice). © 1979.

引用

页码：23 / 41

页数：19

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