CREDIBILITY OF LINEAR EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES IN A DISCRETE-TIME FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAME

被引：16

作者：

EHTAMO, H

HAMALAINEN, RP

机构：

[1] Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, 02150

[2] Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, 02150

来源：

GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 1995年 / 4卷 / 01期

关键词：

DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES; FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAMES; PARETO-OPTIMAL EFFORTS; LINEAR EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; CREDIBILITY OF STRATEGIES;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01384291

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this article we consider a two-country dynamic game model of whaling in discrete time. We assume that the countries have exact information, with one-period time delay, about each other's whaling efforts as measured by the number of vessels involved in whaling. It is shown how strategies that linearly depend on the whaling effort of the other country can be used to support a given Pareto-optimal agreement so that there will not be a temptation for unilateral deviation from the agreed decision. The credibility of these cooperative equilibrum strategies is discussed.

引用

页码：27 / 37

页数：11

共 12 条

[1]

Clark CW, 1985, BIOECONOMIC MODELLIN

[2]

CLEMHOUT S, 1991, LECTURE NOTES CONTRO, V157, P132

[3] SOLUTION FOR A DYNAMIC BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH AN APPLICATION TO RESOURCE-MANAGEMENT [J].