THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF OPTIMAL AUCTIONS

被引：237

作者：

BULOW, J ^{[1
]}

ROBERTS, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CHICAGO,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,CHICAGO,IL 60637

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1989年 / 97卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261643

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1060 / 1090

页数：31

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