GLOBAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

被引：659

作者：

CARLSSON, H ^{[1
]}

VANDAMME, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TILBURG UNIV,CTR ECON RES,5000 LE TILBURG,NETHERLANDS

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1993年 / 61卷 / 05期

关键词：

GLOBAL GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; RISK DOMINANCE; PAYOFF UNCERTAINTY; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; ITERATED DOMINANCE;

D O I：

10.2307/2951491

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.

引用

页码：989 / 1018

页数：30

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