THE PROBLEM OF UNOBSERVABLES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH

In this paper we argue that unobservable constructs lie at the core of a number of influential theories used in the strategic management literature-including agency theory, transaction cost theory, and the resource-based view of the firm. The debate over how best to deal with the problem of unobservables has raged in the philosophy of science literature for the best parr of the current century. On the one hand there are the positivists, who believe that theories containing unobservable constructs are only useful as tools for making predictions. According to positivists, such theories do not inform us about the deep structure of reality. On the other hand, there are the realists, who believe that our theories can give us knowledge about unobservables. Herein we review this debate, we argue for adopting a realist position, and we draw out the implications for strategic management research.