OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN

被引:50
作者
LICHTENBERG, FR [1 ]
PUSHNER, GM [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV NEW HAVEN,DEPT ECON & FINANCE,W HAVEN,CT 06516
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PRODUCTIVITY; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; CORPORATE CROSS-SHAREHOLDING; MAIN BANKS; JAPAN; PROFITABILITY;
D O I
10.1016/0922-1425(94)90014-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We test several hypotheses regarding the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Our findings support the proposition that equity ownership by financial institutions in Japan may effectively substitute for the missing external takeover market by resulting in monitoring and intervention which minimizes the danger of lapses in productivity. In contrast, we also find evidence that high levels of intercorporate shareholding insulate firms from their own problems, at the expense of firm performance. Further, we find a notable positive influence of insider ownership, but see no evidence that the influence of financial institutions has diminished in the globalization and prosperity of the 1980s.
引用
收藏
页码:239 / 261
页数:23
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