FOCAL POINTS IN PURE COORDINATION GAMES - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

被引：101

作者：

MEHTA, J

STARMER, C

SUGDEN, R

机构：

[1] School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 1994年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

COMMON KNOWLEDGE; MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA; FOCAL POINTS; SALIENCE; COORDINATION GAMES;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01079211

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper reports an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that in coordination games, players draw on shared concepts of salience to identify 'focal points' on which they can coordinate. The experiment involves games in which equilibria can be distinguished from one another only in terms of the way strategies are labelled. The games are designed to test a number of specific hypotheses about the determinants of salience. These hypotheses are generally confirmed by the results of the experiment.

引用

页码：163 / 185

页数：23

共 23 条

[1]

BACHARACH M, 1991, FRONTIERS GAME THEOR

[2]

COOPER RW, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P218

[3] LEARNING HOW TO COOPERATE - OPTIMAL PLAY IN REPEATED COORDINATION GAMES [J].