DO BIDDER MANAGERS KNOWINGLY PAY TOO MUCH FOR TARGET FIRMS

被引:69
作者
SEYHUN, HN [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CHICAGO,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,CHICAGO,IL 60637
关键词
D O I
10.1086/296516
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:439 / 464
页数:26
相关论文
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