BROKERAGE COMMISSION SCHEDULES

被引:24
作者
BRENNAN, MJ [1 ]
CHORDIA, T [1 ]
机构
[1] LONDON GRAD SCH BUSINESS STUDIES,LONDON,ENGLAND
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2329042
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
It is generally optimal for risk-sharing reasons to base a charge for information on the signal realization. When this is not possible, a charge based on the amount of trading, a brokerage commission, may be a good alternative. The optimal brokerage commission schedule is derived for a risk-neutral information seller faced with risk-averse purchasers who may differ in their risk aversion. Revenues from the brokerage commission are compared with those from a fixed charge for information and the optimal mutual fund management fee.
引用
收藏
页码:1379 / 1402
页数:24
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