STACKELBERG RENT-SEEKING

被引：46

作者：

LINSTER, BG

机构：

[1] United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, 80840-5701, CO

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1993年 / 77卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01047872

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results. I extend the problem to deal with cases of incomplete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent.

引用

收藏

页码：307 / 321

页数：15

相关论文

共 20 条

[1] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J].

BECKER, GS .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) :169-217

[2] THE WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECTLY-UNPRODUCTIVE PROFIT-SEEKING (DUP) LOBBYING ACTIVITIES - PRICE VERSUS QUANTITY DISTORTIONS [J].

BHAGWATI, JN ;

SRINIVASAN, TN .

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (1-2) :33-44

[3] DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE, PROFIT-SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES [J].

BHAGWATI, JN .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1982, 90 (05) :988-1002

[4] THE GENERALIZED THEORY OF TRANSFERS AND WELFARE - EXOGENOUS (POLICY-IMPOSED) AND ENDOGENOUS (TRANSFER-INDUCED) DISTORTIONS [J].

BHAGWATI, JN ;

BRECHER, RA ;

HATTA, T .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 100 (03) :697-714

[5] LOBBYING AND WELFARE [J].

BHAGWATI, JN .

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1980, 14 (03) :355-363

[6]

BINMORE K, 1988, ECON PHILOS, V3, P179

[7]

Buchanan J. M., 1980, THEORY RENT SEEKING

[8]

Congleton Roger D., 1980, THEORY RENT SEEKING, P153

[9] LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN RENT-SEEKING [J].

CORCORAN, WJ .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1984, 43 (01) :89-94

[10] EFFICIENT RENTS .1. RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR IN THE LONG-RUN [J].

CORCORAN, WJ ;

KARELS, GV .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :227-246