A THEORY OF CREDIBILITY

被引：257

作者：

SOBEL, J

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1985年 / 52卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297732

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：557 / 573

页数：17

共 10 条

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[6] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J].

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[7] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

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[8] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J].

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[9]

SOBEL J, 1983, UCSD8321 U CAL DISC

[10]

WILSON R, 1985, GAME THEORETIC MODEL

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