TROUBLED DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF PRIVATE REORGANIZATION OF FIRMS IN DEFAULT

被引:410
作者
GILSON, SC [1 ]
JOHN, K [1 ]
LANG, LHP [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU,NEW YORK,NY 10003
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0304-405X(90)90059-9
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study investigates the incentives of financially distressed firms to restructure their debt privately rather than through formal bankruptcy. In a sample of 169 financially distressed companies, about half successfully restructure their debt outside of Chapter 11. Firms more likely to restructure their debt privately have more intangible assets, owe more of their debt to banks, and owe fewer lenders. Analysis of stock returns suggests that the market is also able to discriminate ex ante between the two sets of firms, and that stockholders are systematically better off when debt is restructured privately. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:315 / 353
页数:39
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