REPRESENTATION AS AGENCY AND THE PORK BARREL PARADOX

被引：8

作者：

SCHWARTZ, T

机构：

[1] Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, 90024, CA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01053363

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：3 / 21

页数：19

共 53 条

[1]

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[2]

[Anonymous], 1973, CONGRESSMEN COMMITTE

[3]

Arrow K., 1963, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[4]

Axelrod R., 1970, CONFLICT INTEREST

[5]

Buchanan J. M., 1962, CALCULUS CONSENT

[6]

Buchanan J.M., 1960, FISCAL THEORY POLITI, P25

CARSON, RT ;

OPPENHEIMER, JA .

COLLIE, MP .

COX, GW ;

TUTT, TN .

FIORINA, MP ;

NOLL, RG .