ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET AND CORPORATE FINANCING, DIVIDEND, AND COMPENSATION POLICIES

被引:476
作者
GAVER, JJ [1 ]
GAVER, KM [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV GEORGIA,JM TULL SCH ACCOUNTING,ATHENS,GA 30602
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-4101(93)90007-3
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper presents additional evidence on the relation between the investment opportunity set and financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Our results are based on a sample of 237 growth firms and 237 nongrowth firms. We find that growth firms have significantly lower debt/equity ratios and exhibit significantly lower dividend yields than nongrowth firms. We also find that growth firms pay significantly higher levels of cash compensation to their executives and have a significantly higher incidence of stock option plans than nongrowth firms. However, controlling for firm size, the incidence of bonus plans, performance plans, and restricted stock plans does not differ between growth and nongrowth samples.
引用
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页码:125 / 160
页数:36
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