REPEATED MORAL HAZARD

被引：272

作者：

ROGERSON, WP

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911724

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：69 / 76

页数：8

共 13 条

[1]

BRAVERMAN, 1982, AM EC REV, V72, P596

[2] MODEL OF SOCIAL INSURANCE WITH VARIABLE RETIREMENT [J].

DIAMOND, PA ;

MIRRLEES, JA .

[3]

LAMBERT R, 1982, LONG TERM CONTRACTS

[4]

Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[5] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].

MYERSON, RB .

[6]

RADNER R, 1981, 184 BELL LAB DISC PA

[7]

RADNER R, 1981, REPEATED PRINCIPAL A

[8]

RADNER R, 1981, OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA S

[9]

ROGERSON WP, UNPUB ECONOMETRICA

[10]

ROGERSON WP, 1982, IMSSS388 TECHN REP